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This paper proposes a framework to analyze the varying understanding of democratic 
developments. Based on the theory of frame-analysis, it distinguishes six brackets 
within which democratic developments can be interpreted. This framework is applied 
to identify the nature of international rankings of domestic democracy and to compare 
the framing of developments in Polish democracy in reports on democratic develop-
ments from international organizations. The conclusion is that sense-making of demo-
cratic developments in general varies enormously, and that this is also visible in the 
international rankings of democracy. Democratic developments in Poland are also 
assessed in different ways, resulting in varying claims about the nature of the develop-
ments in Poland.
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Introduction
That democracy is about more than elections is well-known, but according to 
geraldo Munck, “it is striking that there is little agreement concerning how far 
beyond electoral processes—the home ground of most definitions of democracy—
the quality of democracy extends.”1 Such differences are also visible in international 
indexes for ranking democracies as these use a variety of indicators. examples are 
the indexes of Freedom House, Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), the International 
Institute for Democracy and electoral assistance (IDea), and the Sustainable 
governance Indicators (SgI) of the Bertelsmann Foundation. What all these organi-
zations have in common is that they provide country rankings based on what they 
define as the quality of democracy.
To reflect on those indexes has never been more relevant, as democracy is said to 
be in crisis. This is seen in the yearly reports of institutes that produce international 
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rankings of democracies, such as Freedom House, V-Dem, and the Bertelsmann 
Foundation. These observations deeply contrast the positive remarks from over a 
decade ago.2 In 2008, Freedom House was still very optimistic, telling us, “in mid-
1992 about 24.8% of the world population lived in ‘free’ countries. Until mid-2007, 
this figure increased to 45.9%.”3
The discussion about the state of democracy is topical again because of recent 
developments in, for instance, Poland, Hungary, and Turkey. These countries 
encounter heavy criticism for their return to autocratic regimes. The international 
criticism on election processes and the one-sided outcomes in Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and the outside meddling in elections in among oth-
ers the United States and the United Kingdom the criticism is also increasing. The 
question is, however, whether the assessment of backsliding democracy is justi-
fied and whether the indicators to back this claim is valid in general. Such ques-
tions are relevant, because there are also contrary views. The Stockholm institute 
IDea, for instance, concludes:
The empirical overview suggests that the current global state of democracy is one of 
trendless fluctuations—upturns and downturns in individual countries, but with no 
broad tendencies of decline or progress.4
This article argues that such contrary views are due to the way people make sense of 
democracy and the dimensions included and excluded. Taking inspiration from 
erving goffman,5 this is what we call bracketing. It involves the aspects inside the 
equation and the things left out. It is not about putting democracy between brackets—
although many discussants seem to do that—but putting the specific dimensions/
aspects/elements between brackets by which it becomes possible to judge the quality 
of democracy. Sometimes such bracketing is done explicitly, as on the website of the 
globalDemocracyRanking,6 presenting the following formula: Quality of Democracy 
= (Freedom & other characteristics of the political system) & (Performance of the 
nonpolitical dimensions). However, as the contents of this article will show, this is 
only one of many possible ways to make sense of democracy.
This results in the following research questions underlying this article: What are 
the different ways to bracket democratic developments and what does this imply for 
the understanding of developments therein? We answer these questions through con-
secutively answering the following subquestions:
1. What is bracketing?
2. What bracketing emerges out of the literature on democratic developments?
3. What analyses do such bracketing enable?
4. What outcomes result from conducting such research?
In answering these questions, this article proposes a framework to analyze the vary-
ing understanding of democratic developments. Based on erving goffman’s theory 
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of frame-analysis, the framework distinguishes six brackets within which demo-
cratic developments can be interpreted. This framework is applied to compare the 
framing of developments in Polish democracy in reports on democratic develop-
ments from international organizations.
The next section elaborates on the concept of bracketing. goffman defined brack-
eting as a solution people use to deal with the complexities involved in the frame’s 
relation to the environing world in which the framing occurs.7 It refers to what we all 
do when trying to identify what is going on, namely, to include certain aspects of a 
phenomenon (putting it within the bracket) and to neglect or disregard other aspects 
thereof (leaving it outside the bracket). Subsequently, we apply this idea of bracket-
ing to the conception of democracy. In the third section, we distinguish between 
democracy as having inclusiveness in elections, having contestation as seen in fair 
elections, having capacitated and involved citizens, and having democratic leaders 
promoting liberal and social democracy. It results in a proposal for a framework to 
identify what people are talking about when assessing the quality of democracies.
The fourth section argues the relevance of such a framework. We apply the 
framework to identify the content of existing international rankings to understand 
the various ways in which developments in the Polish democracy are addressed in 
such reports. Many scholars judge Poland to be one of the main examples of dete-
riorating democracy. This section argues that this claim is based on the bracketing 
of democracy. It also argues that when the original elements of the concept of 
democracy would be central—inclusiveness and contestation—different claims 
could be in order.
Framing and Bracketing
The concept of framing has become problematic as it is increasingly seen as just 
a political strategy aimed at winning a debate, beating an opponent, and gaining 
support through using rhetorical statements, normative judgments, and all too simple 
associations.8 Such strategic framing achieves its goal if the framing appeals to the 
audience, irrespective whether it relates to what is going on. Politicians can do this 
through a focus on a policy, a personality, or a principle, by using one-liners and 
associations triggering emotions, that need not be valid interpretations of reality.9 It 
is the way the american president Donald Trump portrays all opposition as lying, 
stupid, ignorant, crazy opponents, abusing their power, and producing fake news, 
while portraying himself as the hero, being the only one who understands what 
would make america great again. The sense-making/signification of issues in terms 
of villains or suckers (the opponents) versus heroes and victims (the ones whose 
support is sought) provides a specific interpretation of things that happen in society, 
things to be done, or to be prevented.
Such strategic framing is also visible after crises, when stakeholders construct 
frames that depict the crisis as either caused by flawed politics, (ir)responsible 
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individuals, faulty policies (social frameworks), or in natural frameworks, identifying 
occurrences as undirected, unanimated, unguided, that is, “purely physical.”10 It is, 
among others, seen in blame games11 and in attempts to mobilize collective action to 
tackle wicked problems.12
Strategic framing has three distinctive characteristics. First, it aims to gain sup-
port among the audience, which is most effectively done through dramatization 
and inflaming emotions. It need not be an informative or correct interpretation of 
events. Second, effective strategic framing oversimplifies reality, that is, using 
one-liners to interpret and explain what is going on. It uses an either–or strategy, 
implying that one has to interpret what happens within either such or so a frame. 
Third, such framing is always normative, giving positive or negative connotations 
to what is happening.
The above clarifies that framing has become something that is to be judged as 
negative. It also disregards the original more neutral meaning of framing, meant to 
be a tool to provide an answer to the question individuals always ask: “What is it that 
is going on here?”13 but as goffman told immediately after:
It is obvious that in most “situations” many different things are happening simultane-
ously—things that are likely to have begun at different moments and may terminate 
dyssynchronously. To ask the question what is it that is going on here, biases the mat-
ters in the direction of unitary exposition and simplicity.14
goffman emphasized that narrow strategic framing by keying an event around 
one issue, is not what happens in everyday life. People use frames when investi-
gating social phenomena like the development of democracy, but these are rather 
different from strategic frames. The main difference with strategic framing is that 
everyday-framing does not necessarily intend to have political effects. Its main 
intention is to stay as close as possible to what is “really” happening. goffman 
argued that “it might be thought that only arguments and competence to express 
matters verbally will be in play. But that is much too narrow a view.”15 Normally 
there is not a contrast between the frame and what is going on, which makes 
strategic framing so exceptional in everyday life. according to goffman, every-
day interpretative frames are about the interpretation and sense-making of the 
actual unaltered event that takes place. Frames are mental structures that simplify 
and guide our understanding of a complex reality16 and enable us to explain the 
reality to others. It is about interpreting it in a social or natural frame and the 
keying involved.
The problem with using the framing-concept is the negative connotation it got 
through the years and the ambiguity its use incites. Returning to the origins of the 
theory on framing and what it involves it seems preferable to use the word brack-
eting that was originally part of the theory on framing. Regarding the subject 
under scrutiny, democracy, bracketing together with keying points to the meaning 
people attach to living in a democracy. as goffman put it, “Keying concerns the 
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set of conventions through which a given activity, which is already meaningful in 
terms of the primary framework, is transformed into something patterned on this 
activity.”17 It implies adding a layer to the activity to which one anchors the event 
and wants to interpret and understand it.18 Bracketing in time and space is broader 
than keying, as it determines when people see an event starting and ending, what 
they see as inclusive to the event, whether or not they consider the context in 
which the event takes place, and what one considers to be organizational proper-
ties of the event.19 Bracketing means determining what is within and what is out-
side the framing of the event.20
Bracketing Democracy
The concept of democracy is illustrative for understanding keying and bracket-
ing. The classic definition of democracy is that it is “the social mechanism which 
permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions.”21 
Later on Seymour Lipset defined it as the ability of citizens to choose their govern-
ment through free elections that are contests among parties operating in an atmos-
phere of guaranteed freedom of speech and press.22 This conception conforms with 
the definition given by Robert Dahl23 and emphasizes the two procedural elements 
of democracy, that is, contestation and inclusiveness. Contestation exists when citi-
zens “have unimpaired opportunities . . . to formulate their preferences, to signify 
their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and col-
lective action, and to have their preferences weighed equally in the conduct of the 
government.”24 Inclusiveness refers to “the proportion of the population entitled to 
participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct 
of the government.”25
These two elements remained central in many of the definitions given afterwards, 
although the wording has changed.26 according to edward Muller, “the egalitarian 
political institutions of modern democracy provide all citizens with both the oppor-
tunity to participate in the governing process, as manifested by universal adult suf-
frage and free and fair elections, and the opportunity to contest governmental 
decisions, as manifested by rights of freedom of expression and association.”27 Dahl 
himself argued that inclusiveness and contestation require institutional guarantees 
such as freedom of organization, freedom of expression, the right to vote, broad eli-
gibility for public office, the right to compete for support and votes, the availability 
of alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and the dependence of 
public policies on citizens’ preferences. Hence, the rule of law and promoting civil 
rights entered the equation.
Nonetheless, scholars judged this definition still to be minimalistic, pointing out 
that it is only about procedures and rules in making collective decisions.28 They 
argue that democracy also refers to a substantial ideal, that is, the prevention of the 
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abuses of power and the promotion of basic rights. In this conception, democracy is 
not only about who decides and how they decide but also about “what” is decided. 
These scholars judge the substance of the decisions made in terms of social equality 
and/or liberalism to be part and parcel of the conception of democracy. Below, we 
will elaborate on each of these elements resulting in a framework enabling us to 
specify the bracketing of democracy in international rankings.
Inclusiveness → Democracy = (Universal suffrage)
applying keying and bracketing to the concept of democracy, the narrowest form 
of a primary framework is just looking at the presence of elections and the extent to 
which suffrage is universal. This is what democracy is about in its most elementary 
connotation. Nearly all countries in the world—the exceptions being Brunei and 
Qatar—have some kind of elections at the local and/or national level every so many 
years, and are in this narrow sense democracies.
The straight-forwardness of the actual event does not prevent the event from 
evoking rather different interpretations/keying. Such an election process can enable 
or fail to empower the participants. They might have the feeling that because of the 
elections their interests will be taken into account, that they have influence in who, 
what, and how things that matter to them are going to be decided on. It might also 
give legitimacy to the people in power, based on the argument that they represent the 
people and act on their behalf in their decision-making. It is the rise in the number of 
countries that have general elections that makes an organization like the international 
IDea rather positive about the global developments in democracy.
Recent surveys point out that the positive valuation of this kind of democracy is 
no longer the common one. Not even among people in old established democracies. 
In 2018, the Democracy Perception Index (DPI) found that a majority of people 
around the world feel like they have no voice in politics and that their governments 
are not acting in their interest (51 and 58 percent, respectively). The research pointed 
out that they have little faith that their government is formed “by the people” and 
works “for the people.”29 One-half to two-thirds of the people answer “never” or 
“rarely” to the question “Do you feel that the voice of people like you matters in poli-
tics?” Half of the population in countries like the United States, Brazil, Canada, 
australia, the United Kingdom, Ireland, South africa, Switzerland, and Sweden are 
this negative. More than 60 percent of the populations in old democracies like the 
Netherlands, Belgium, germany, Norway, austria, Portugal, and France think so, 
and even three-quarters of the population in Japan answers in this way.
Many people seem to be disillusioned and agree with the cynical and classic 
saying of Mark Twain that “if voting made any difference, they wouldn’t let us do 
it.” In terms of primary frameworks, one can say that for many people elections 
and voting do no longer fit into the same social framework they were once intended 
for. elections and voting as such have lost their positively valued associations and 
meaningfulness.
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This brings us to a broader bracketing of democracy in which dependent on the 
perspective also characteristics of the voters, the election process and the output and/
or outcomes thereof are included. Below, these characteristics are discussed.
Contestation → Democracy = (Fair Election Process)
The quality of a democratic process is deemed inferior if there is hardly any con-
testation, that is, if a president is elected by 96 percent of the votes as happened in 
Kazakhstan in 2011, or even by 100 percent as in North Korea. Such one-sided 
outcomes are also found in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Singapore, Zimbabwe, Hong 
Kong, Donetsk People’s Republic, and Cuba. The quality of democracy is higher 
when there is a level playing field for the opposition to get elected, that is, whether 
there are fair elections. This is doubted when landslide victories are in place.
This idea was central in the old Vanhanen Index of Democracy30 in which compe-
tition (and participation) were central. He defined competition as “the percentage 
share of the smaller parties and independents of the votes cast in parliamentary elec-
tions, or of the seats in parliament.”31 For Tatu Vanhanen, being a full democracy 
implies that the largest party should not have more than 70 percent of the seats and 
that at least 10 percent of the eligible participation should have the right to vote. This 
idea is still popular, as is seen in the Polity IV project, arguing that
a fully institutionalized (+10) democracy, like australia, greece, or Sweden, has insti-
tutionalized procedures for open, competitive, and deliberative political participation; 
chooses and replaces chief executives in open, competitive elections; and imposes 
substantial checks and balances on the discretionary powers of the chief executive.32
On the opposite side, in Turkey,
The election process appeared mostly free, but largely unfair. Opposition candidates 
received little to no media coverage; the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) 
candidate, Selahattin Demirtas, had to campaign from prison; and the government 
restrained freedom of speech and freedom of association.”33
adding the layer of fairness to democracy brings us back to the thoughts of Robert 
Dahl.34 He mentioned five conditions to be crucial for the quality of election pro-
cesses. The main criterion being that all people eligible to vote are to be treated as 
if they are equally qualified to participate in the process of making decisions. To 
achieve this, citizens must have adequate and equal opportunities to form their 
preference, and to express reasons for one outcome over the other; each vote needs 
to be counted as equal; they must have ample opportunities for discovering and 
affirming what choice would best serve their interests; they must have control over 
the agenda; and the more citizens are included, the higher the quality of the 
democracy. These thoughts can be translated into measures through the following 
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indicators; the proportion of the population eligible to vote, the proportion of the 
population that actually votes (turnout), the alternatives they can choose from, the 
diversity of the information they can acquire (e.g., media freedom), and their 
involvement in the democratic process (e.g., party membership).
Taking such criteria into account, the number of democracies falls rapidly. The 
Polity IV project tells that in 2015 only 4.1 billion people out of 7.35 billion lived in 
a democracy, and the Economist is even more pessimistic for 2018, as only approxi-
mately 400 million people live in a full democracy.35
as to the alternatives to choose from during elections, Freedom House con-
cludes that
governments have increasingly shed the thin façade of democratic practice that they 
established in previous decades. . . . More authoritarian powers are now banning oppo-
sition groups or jailing their leaders, dispensing with term limits, and tightening the 
screws on any independent media that remain.36
The importance of media pluralism and freedom is emphasized by the same organi-
zation, telling in the spirit of Robert Dahl,
a free and vibrant media sector is a foundational element of a healthy democratic sys-
tem. Citizens should have access to fact-based information—both in traditional news 
sources and on social media—to understand how their governments function and to 
hold their leaders accountable for their words and actions.37
However, as the Bertelsmann Stiftung (Foundation) concludes in its report on 
Sustainable governance Indicators, “The model of liberal democracy is subject to 
growing pressure—in some countries this means that even central democratic and 
constitutional standards such as media freedoms are already severely damaged or 
undermined.”38 according to the Bertelsmann Foundation, many countries show 
negative developments, while the rest of the countries remain at their previous levels:
The following indicators can be highlighted in particular: media access for candidates 
and parties in the electoral process, party financing, media freedom, media pluralism, 
citizens’ access to information, civil rights, political liberties, non-discrimination and 
the appointment of justices. at the same time, the results show the declining quality of 
democracy extends across all four democracy criteria (electoral processes, access to 
information, civil rights and political liberties, rule of law).39
also, the valuation of the quality of democracy indicators varies widely among citi-
zens in different countries. The Democracy Perception Index shows that across the 
50 countries surveyed, somewhat more than half of respondents (56 percent) say that 
“the news they read ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ gives them a balanced or neutral informa-
tion.”40 even more than 60 percent say so in full democracies like greece, France, 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, and the USa.
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Institutional Requirements → Democracy = (Capacitated Citizens)
One of the oldest ways of framing democracy is that the citizens need to be 
involved citizens, that they do inform themselves, that they do know the different 
options and the reasoning behind it, and that they do participate in the democratic 
process. This idea of democracy is already discussed for more than two millennia. It 
is based on the customary, almost obligatory, starting point to refer to the democratic 
origins in ancient greece. In ancient athens, democracy only applied to the well-
educated, free males, born and raised in the polis, who supposedly could reason and 
bring their arguments forward in an eloquent way.
although most countries nowadays have universal suffrage, many philoso-
phers still adhere to the idea that the electorate should possess certain capabilities 
to make democracy work and that there should be institutional guarantees.41 Some 
even argue that democracy is less about voting than it is about reaching well-
argued consensus based on argumentation.42 Jurgen Habermas sees a similarity 
between democracy and bringing issues before a court in which based on the 
strength of arguments and rationality, a consensus is formed about what is to be 
done. Respect and use of basic rights like civic and political freedom, right to 
participate in democratic process, equal opportunities, equal treatment, and jus-
tice apply to all citizens. according to Habermas, such justice, rational communi-
cation, and social solidarity enable equal participation in a public sphere and 
further democracy. He argues that the impact of the domestic sphere, loyalties, 
and individual interests can be minimalized. Democracy is less about voting than 
about reaching consensus, for which those involved need to know and to adhere 
to the rules of pragmatic rationality.
Similar, but still rather different, is the theory of amartya Sen.43 His basic concern 
is put on individuals’ freedom to achieve the kind of lives they have reason to value. 
He points to the need for a capacitated electorate to further public reason and demo-
cratic politics as the best way to come to legitimate decisions. Needed, according to 
Sen, is commitment among those involved in democratic processes. Sen argues that 
democracy is a demanding system, and not just a mechanical condition (like majority 
rule) taken in isolation.44 It rests on
the intrinsic importance of political participation and freedom in human life; second, 
the instrumental importance of political incentives in keeping governments responsible 
and accountable; and third, the constructive role of democracy in the formation of 
values and the understanding of needs, rights, and duties.45
Others even made a plea for a “philosopher citizen”—as the counterpart to Plato’s 
philosopher king.46 In the same spirit, Robert goodin wants to replace voting as 
an aggregation of opinions by deliberation. as he tells, “votes are good, reasons 
better.”47 He argues for “deliberative democracy within,” demanding from citi-
zens not only to look at their personal preferences, but to assess what is “the right 
10 east european Politics and Societies and Cultures
thing to do from all perspectives. It asks each of us to internalize the perspective 
of each (prototypical) other.”48
as to such commitment to reach consensus, international institutes are skeptical 
about developments therein. The economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 
(eIU) incorporates societal cohesion.
The Democracy Index looks at social cohesion and asks whether there is a sufficient 
degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable, functioning democ-
racy. The score here has deteriorated for several years, suggesting a deepening of 
political polarization that could complicate political effectiveness and weaken the 
quality of policymaking and institutions. In this context, it seems too soon, despite 
the results of the 2018 Democracy Index, to suggest that the “democracy recession” 
has bottomed out.”49
as to the participation in the democratic process, the SgI points out that democratic 
disillusion increases as seen in decreasing party membership and turnout during 
elections. as the Bertelsmann Foundation concludes,
Many governments today rely less than before on the consultation of societal actors 
during the planning phase of political projects. . . . Many governments are obviously 
less successful than before in pursuing a coherent communication strategy that is 
aligned with broader government agendas.50
Participation → Democracy = (Civic Involvement)
Such deterioration of civic involvement is not the case when analyzing their par-
ticipation in policy processes. To enhance direct democracy and to obtain better 
service delivery outcomes, public participation in policy processes, co-production in 
the implementation of policies, and co-creation in the development thereof have 
become more and more daily practice.51 Coproduction practices are innovative as 
citizens are asked to co-design, co-commission, co-asses, co-deliver, co-implement, 
and co-execute public services.52 The practice has advanced significantly, even to 
the degree that citizen engagement has become obligatory in some sectors and in 
some countries, e.g. care-giving and waste management.53 For public organizations 
to continue to provide basic services to the populace, public professionals are more 
and more inclined to involve citizens in voluntary and complementary service 
design and implementation. Scholarly research has demonstrated the benefit of citi-
zens/service users in delivering public services54 and how outcomes from such ser-
vices could improve.55
Such co-production is in line with the idea of citizens as stakeholders not so much 
interested in electing officials as they are in getting optimal outcomes. Such forms of 
more direct democracy are in the direct participation of people having a stake in the 
policies. More generally, next to party membership and referenda, participatory 
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budgeting, open government seeking direct involvement of the public in the realiza-
tion of their goals are perceived as novel developments in this regard.
Content of Decisions → Democracy = (Leaders Promote Liberal 
Democracy)
a fifth way of bracketing democracy lies in the actions of the elected leaders. 
Taking them into the equation of democracy asks who the elected officials are and 
what it is they do after they are elected. Do they further democracy, or threaten the 
foundations thereof? Such actions can involve the reduction of the checks and bal-
ances built in the system, reducing the freedom of the press, phasing out the separa-
tion of powers, and concentrating power in their own hands. If the leaders take such 
actions and reduce the quality of the democracy, the country is seen as becoming less 
democratic. It is the criticism on what is nowadays called the rise of “populism,” of 
which Transparency International says: “Throughout the world, political leaders 
who run on a populist platform are gaining power and undermining democracy.”56 
The Bertelsmann Foundation tells similarly: “Populist parties in particular often aim 
to systematically sabotage the struggle for suitable political solutions by exploiting 
emotions with their campaigns.”57
Important for the judgment of the quality of democracy is that this populism is 
accused to make anti-democratic and restrictive modifications of crucial aspects of 
legislation, regulating migrant’s rights, access to social protection systems, or inde-
pendence of judicial power.58 It is for such and other reasons that scholars have 
argued that “populists should be criticized for what they are—a real danger to democ-
racy.”59 Hawkins et al.60 suggested that “the number of populist leaders has more 
than doubled since the early 2000s”61 with nowadays approximately two billion 
people living in countries where (somewhat) populist leaders have gained ground. 
They point to countries including Poland, Venezuela, argentina, Italy, India, the 
United States, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, ecuador, Bolivia, the Czech Republic, Turkey, 
Hungary, ecuador, Latvia, Paraguay, and Croatia. according to Lewis at al., working 
for the Guardian, it is worrying that strong populist tendencies are nowadays also 
found in established democracies, including germany, Norway, Sweden, Uruguay, 
Finland, France, Spain, austria, the Netherlands, and Canada.
It is also about the function of democracy to control and punt restraints on govern-
ment. Including control of and restraints on government in the equation of democracy 
implies that democracy is not only about giving people voice but also about offering 
them opportunities to hold government to account. as Max Roser representing the 
Polity IV group argues in Our World in Data, “a democracy is a political system with 
institutions that allow citizens to express their political preferences, has constraints on 
the power of the executive, and a guarantee of civil liberties.”62 Other international 
organizations add that democracy is about the accountability of public officials, 
respecting Human Rights, and freedom of association;63 freedom of assembly and 
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demonstration, respect for the rights and freedoms of minorities (ethnic, religious, 
linguistic, immigrants);64 or still broader, transparency of government policy making, 
satisfaction with democracy and trust in Parliament, reliability of the state budget, 
state accounts, state-owned firms’ accounts, basic economic and financial statistics, 
and reliability of state-owned banks’ accounts, the communication of state economic 
policy, the presence of a public debate about the state economic policy, and the degree 
of transparency in public procurement.65
examples of a deterioration in democracy in this respect are provided by 
Transparency International. On its website, it tells about its index of 2018 that “the 
continued failure of most countries to significantly control corruption is contributing 
to a crisis in democracy around the world” and they conclude that since 2006, 113 
countries have seen a decline in their democracy scores. according to this organiza-
tion, Poland and Hungary in particular are doing worse than before:
In both Hungary and Poland, populist rhetoric is often used to discredit public scrutiny. 
In both countries, democratic institutions and values are at risk, and the government 
continually interferes and challenges the independence of both the media and judicial 
system.66
Content of Decisions → Democracy = (Leaders Promote Social 
Democracy)
a last type of bracketing of democracy involves the outcomes of democracy. In a 
democracy, the policies developed need to be for the good of society as a whole. This 
interpretation is meant to prevent democracy to be a process in which two wolves 
and a sheep vote over what to have for dinner. For instance, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights of the UN sees the protection and respect of human 
rights as an essential element of democracy. They tell that “group rights (e.g., indig-
enous peoples, minorities, persons with disabilities), are . . . essential for democracy 
as they ensure an equitable distribution of wealth, and equality and equity in respect 
of access to civil and political rights.”67 The UN mentions as “essential democratic 
underpinnings” human rights fundamental freedoms, the equal rights of women and 
men, life in larger freedom, self-determination, and the removal of distinctions based 
on “race, sex, language or religion.” It refers to the following:
Fundamental Rights capturing the degree to which civil liberties are respected, and 
whether people have access to basic resources that enable their active participation in 
the political process. This dimension . . . has three sub-dimensions. Two of them (fair 
trials and civil liberties) relate to the concept of liberal democracy, while the third 
(social rights and equality) relates to the concept of social democracy.68
Promoting social democracy is also about impartial administration, that concerns 
how “fairly and predictably political decisions are implemented, and thus reflects 
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key aspects of the rule of law.”69 V-Dem explicitly sees egalitarian policies as a 
component of social democracy. Democracy is concerned with human development, 
as it creates a level playing field, in equalizing resources (e.g., access to health care, 
education, infrastructure, and media) among the electorate and developing sustain-
able policies.
However, in this broad sense, the situation in the world also seems to be deterio-
rating, especially in europe. The SgI tells that “Poland, which alongside the United 
States, the Netherlands and australia is one of the biggest losers when it comes to the 
aspect of social policy, has also experienced setbacks in terms of integration policy 
in recent years.”70 The Bertelsmann foundation agrees, when it tells in its latest report 
on Sustainable governance Indicators: “as the bar for democratic standards contin-
ues to be lowered and political polarization grows, it is becoming increasingly diffi-
cult to carry out sustainable reforms.”71
The Resulting Framework
In the above, it was argued that democracy can be bracketed in multiple ways. On 
the one hand, democracy is about ensuring a representative democracy with citizens 
electing their leaders, the quality of a democracy depending on characteristics of that 
electorate, of the voting process and of the actions of the elected politicians. On the 
other hand, democracy is about ensuring direct democracy, with citizens participat-
ing in decision-making processes, the quality thereof depending on. This is sum-
marized in Figure 1.
In the middle of the figure is the core of a democracy, i.e., in a representative 
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officials on the right, and in a direct democracy the participatory process in the mid-
dle, the stakeholders on the left and the policy decisionmakers on the right. above 
and below, the characteristics are given by which one can frame that process. Table 
1 gives the possible indicators for the six brackets.
The bracketing involved in such framing can be narrow, that is, taking only one or 
two aspects into account, or broader, dependent on the number of aspects incorpo-
rated within the brackets defining democracy. Table 2 gives the operationalization of 
the bracketing. It tells what indicators are determinative for telling whether an aspect 
was included.
The framework enables content analyses allowing an evaluation of international 
rankings. Such an analysis is presented below. The expectation is that international 
rankings vary in their bracketing of the concept of democracy and that such bracket-
ing is also related to their assessment in specific cases, in this research, developments 
in Poland. additional analyses based on this framework enable an understanding of 
discussions about democratic developments in general. It is again expected that the 
valuation of multidimensional concepts in general and democratic developments in 
particular is not only determined by actual developments but especially due to the 
broadness and specific bracketing of the concept. The inclusion and exclusion of 
aspects of democracy determines the arguments on which one bases a claim for a 
deterioration or improvement thereof.
The Varying Bracketing in International Rankings and Their 
Assessment of Recent Developments in Poland
Below we illustrate that the framework enables us to understand differences in 
international democracy rankings and to understand the critical remarks made on 
developments in democracy in a specific case, that is, Poland.
We take Poland as an example as many scholars have argued its democratic back-
sliding since 2015—being the year representatives of the conservative Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość (PiS) (in english: Law and Justice Party) came into power.72 Polish 
policies interpreted by international observers as contrary to basic democratic rights 
and the needed separation of powers, especially with regard to the change in regula-
tions concerning the retirement of old judges and the appointment of new judges, 
triggered the european Commission in December 2017 to start an article 7 procedure 
against Poland. The Commission judged the developments in this country to be an 
infringement of article 2 of the european Constitution, in which the basic values of 
the eU are stated.
Crucial for selecting this country to illustrate the usefulness of our bracketing 
scheme is that all brackets are in play. The scholarly literature points to indicators for 
democratic backsliding in Poland in which all our brackets are reflected. exemplary 
is the article by Wojciech Sadurski.73 First of all, he mentions that the actual power 
is not held by those democratically elected (bracket 1). Furthermore, Sadurski 
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Table 1
The Brackets and Possible Indicators
aspect Indicators
Inclusiveness Universal or limited suffrage
Turnout in elections
Civic capabilities Freedom of assembly and demonstration




Societal cohesion or polarization
Contestation Presence of and rules for elections
Dominance of largest party
Regular replacement of elected officials
adequate and equal opportunities to form their preference
Opportunities for discovering and affirming what choice would best serve their 
interests
each vote counted as equal
Control over the agenda
Party membership
Civic involvement Percentage of budget open to participatory budgeting
Policy areas open to co-creation
Policy areas open to co-production
Party membership
Media coverage
Presence of and rules for referenda
Transparency of government policy making
Protecting liberal 
democracy
expansion or reduction of the checks and balances built in the system
expansion or reduction of the freedom of the press
Protecting or phasing out the separation of powers
Dispersing or concentrating power
Pluralism and populism
accountability of public officials
Satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament
Reliability of the public budgets
The communication of state economic policy
The presence of a public debate about the state economic policy
Protecting social 
democracy
The rights of women and men
Respect for the rights and freedoms of minorities
Policies ensuring life in freedom
Policies protecting self-determination
Changing distinctions on the basis of race, sex, language or religion











































































































































































































































































































































































































de Vries and Sobis / Bracketing Democracy 17
mentions the limitations in the freedom of assembly by the Polish government 
(bracket 2) through privileging demonstrations that celebrate events of high impor-
tance in Polish history and the abolishment of constitutional rights to appeal against 
decisions to prohibit a public assembly.74 He also mentions the changing rules for 
controls on the fairness of elections and the changing rules for ballots being consid-
ered to be valid (bracket 3). Furthermore, developments include the state capture of 
national media that are said to have become propaganda machines for the govern-
ment (bracket 4), and the removal of checks and balances through the subordination 
of the judicial system to the executive branch, which was done through changing the 
composition of the judiciary and removing judges opposing governmental decisions 
(bracket 5). Last but not least, Sadurski points to the demonizing of specific groups 
in society—especially members of the LgBTx-community and immigrants—as well 
as policies reflecting populism (bracket 6).
Sadurski wanted to make the claim that democracy in Poland is backsliding and 
used all the above arguments to substantiate this point. This does not imply that these 
arguments are undisputed. The claims can well be a consequence of the political 
preferences of this author. This makes the position of international rankings and their 
interpretation of the developments in Poland all the more relevant as these are sup-
posedly independent rankings.
In the ranking of such developments as those from Freedom House, the position 
of Poland worsened steadily for the last five years, with a democracy score of 80 of 
100 in 2015, then being named a consolidated democracy, to 65 of 100 in 2020, 
resulting in an inferior classification as a semi-consolidated democracy.
The broadness of the bracketing as found in the scholarly literature is reflected to 
a varying degree in the different reports on democratic rankings. Freedom House 
considers the democratic character of the governmental system, and the indepen-
dence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches 
(bracket 5); the conditions for fair electoral processes and civic involvement (brack-
ets 3 and 4); the strength of civil society, that is, the organizational capacity and 
financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in 
which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the 
policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups (bracket 2); 
the existence of independent media (bracket 3) local democratic governance (bracket 
1); and constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status 
of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects 
and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions (bracket 5). The Freedom 
house ranking does include developments in the rule of law, decentralization, and 
corruption under the banner of democracy. This is not the case in our framework. 
attention for the protection or deterioration of social democracy is not found as a 
separate heading in the Freedom House ranking.75
The V-Dem ranking is similar in including inclusiveness, contestation, and the 
protection of liberal democracy, but is different in its inclusion of civic capabilities 
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and participatory and social democracy. In V-Dem, the former addresses active par-
ticipation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and nonelectoral. Social 
democracy is covered by its inclusion of the egalitarian principle as indicated by 
encompassingness and the equality in welfare, education, and health policies. as the 
producers themselves tell:
to what extent all social groups enjoy equal capabilities to participate in the political 
arena. It relies on the idea that democracy is a system of rule “by the people” where 
citizens participate in various ways, such as making informed voting decisions, 
expressing opinions, demonstrating, running for office, or influencing policy making 
in other ways. The egalitarian principle of democracy is fundamentally related to 
political participation, as systematic inequalities in the rights and resources of citizens 
of specific social groups limit capabilities to participate in the political and governing 
processes. Therefore, a more equal distribution of resources across groups results in 
political equality and hence democracy.76
The ranking from IDea is different because it combines the indices for inclusive-
ness and contestation in what is called representative government. Similar to other 
rankings, it includes aspects of liberal democracy. IDea splits this aspect, however, 
in three separate components, namely, fundamental rights, checks on government, 
and impartial administration, thus giving it additional weight. Like the V-Dem rank-
ing, IDea incorporates participatory democracy measuring people’s political par-
ticipation and societal engagement at different levels.77 Outside of the equation in 
this index is attention for social democracy.
The Sustainable governance Indicators (SgI) include four components of democ-
racy, that is, the electoral process, access to information, the rule of law, and civil 
rights/political liberties. In this case, the lower three brackets of democracy—civic 
capabilities, involvement, and social democracy remain outside of the equation.78
Democracy Reporting International (DRI) emphasizes the separation and balance 
of power, independence of the judiciary, a pluralist system of political parties and 
organizations, the rule of law, accountability and transparency, freedom of the media, 
and respect for political rights.79 Thus, it mainly brackets the promotion or deteriora-
tion of liberal democracy in its assessment, although some of the other brackets 
occur under these headings.
Seen in general in the international democracy rankings is that the original ele-
ments of democracy—contestation and inclusiveness—only get minor attention. The 
number of indicators and thus their weight in the final ranking is small in all rank-
ings. On the other hand, the promotion or deterioration of liberal democracy is of 
crucial importance in all rankings. The number of indicators for this element is huge 
in all rankings and that increases the weight thereof in the final assessment. The dif-
ferent rankings vary to the extent they include elements of social democracy, civic 
involvement, and the conditions for fair elections in their bracketing of democracy 
(brackets 3, 4, and 6).
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The international reports producing such rankings do, however, vary in the 
broadness of their bracketing of democracy. That is also seen in the comments vis-
ible in the reports about democratic developments in Poland. Below we address 
some of these comments as found in the reports to illustrate how the reports argue 
their rankings.
The Freedom House bracketing is rather narrow, pointing only to the conservative 
PiS in Poland, who “laid waste to the country’s legal framework in its drive to assert 
political control over the entire judiciary . . . to force the retirement of Supreme Court 
judges and gain partisan influence over the selection of election commission members.”80 
all comments in this report involve the liberal democracy threatened by the Polish 
elected leadership. In its Nations in Transit report, the assessment of Poland is 
broader, as it also reports changes at the local level, and in civic involvement.
The backsliding in liberal democracy was also noted by IDea: “Of particular 
concern are the country’s overall declines on Civil Liberties and Checks on 
government. On Civil Liberties, there is a general deterioration noted on Freedom 
of expression and Freedom of association and assembly. Checks on government 
have experienced setbacks on all three subattributes measured in the gSoD Indices: 
Media Integrity, Judicial Independence and effective Parliament.”81 IDea sees the 
quality of local democracy in Poland and the representativeness of its national 
government as a good practice for regional learning82 and even gives a score of 
0.77 on representative government in Poland, which equals the scores of austria 
and the United Kingdom.83
The report of V-Dem84 sees positive developments in Polish promotion of social 
democracy, as it says, “among electoral democracies . . . Poland . . . stands out as 
over-performers in terms of this indicator of political equality.”85 The negative com-
ments concentrate around liberal democracy and these comments dominate.
The broadest bracketing is found in the SgI-Poland report from the 
Bertelsmann Foundation.86 It does address developments in all the elements of 
democracy, although always with a negative tone. Regarding inclusiveness, the 
report mentions that in 2017, the parliament amended the act on Foreigners 
intending to make the domestic institutional framework for dealing with immi-
grants harsher again.87
as to the capacity of citizens it is said that “some governments—for example in 
. . . Poland—deliberately bypass legally determined consultation procedures or 
exclude government-critical actors from these [the planning phase of reforms] pro-
cesses,”88 and in the case of Poland,89 the country-experts criticize the one-sided 
consultation of societal actors by the respective governments or even a deliberate 
circumvention of the usual procedures:
generally speaking, the government’s clear majority in parliament has reduced the 
need for winning over social actors, and the government perceives many of them as 
enemies. Public consultation has been bypassed by introducing legislative initiatives 
through parliamentarians, since such initiatives do not require the regular consultation 
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mechanisms, and therefore exclude experts and public. Moreover, the quick passage of 
major laws has reduced the time available for meaningful consultation.90
Concerning contestation, it is said that a close connection [exists] between the gov-
ernment takeover of the PiS party and the deterioration in media access.91
Regarding the power of elections to restrain government in its policies, the report 
mentions that
large-scale lawsuits were systematically used against media outlets critical of the gov-
ernment. The visibility of opposition members in the news media gradually deterio-
rated. This was felt most dramatically by HDP parliamentarians who faced allegations 
of supporting terrorism and whose immunity was suspended in the months following 
15 July.92
Contrary to the assessment of V-Dem, SgI gives a negative judgement on the devel-
opments in social democracy as the report mentions that “Poland . . . is one of the 
biggest losers when it comes to the aspect of social policy.”93
This exploratory assessment results in the conclusion that international rankings vary 
a lot in the narrowness or broadness in bracketing democracy and their assessment of 
democratic developments in a country like Poland. On the other hand, they are strik-
ingly similar in putting the emphasis on one bracket, that is, the decisions made by 
elected officials regarding liberal democracy. The attention for citizens’ participation in 
decision making is limited. Neither do they hardly address Civic Involvement and Civic 
capability. This neglects the interesting developments that seem to take place in Poland 
in this regard, such as decentralization, participatory budgeting, and co-production.94 
Taking this into the bracketing could have resulted in a different assessment of develop-
ments in Polish democracy. This brings us to the conclusions.
Conclusions
We asked in which ways democratic developments can be and are conceived and 
what this implies for the varying understandings of democratic developments in 
Poland. We first elaborated on the theory on framing in which bracketing is a central 
concept. Whereas nowadays it is sometimes suggested that framing involves manip-
ulation by giving a single, narrow interpretation of what is going on, the original 
theory on framing did not assume such a limitation in the way people understand 
events. Rather, people and scholars alike are assumed to vary in the broadness of the 
way they give meaning to events. They vary in what they put between brackets and 
include in their understanding and what they leave outside the equation. We also 
argued that the concept of framing as such has gotten a rather negative connotation, 
whereas bracketing is a more neutral term. This points to the preference of using the 
concept of bracketing instead of framing.
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applying this concept of bracketing to the varying possibilities to understand 
developments in democracy, six possible brackets were distinguished, resulting in a 
framework to identify how democracy and the development therein is made sense of. 
The six dimensions include inclusiveness and capabilities of the electorate, contesta-
tion and civic involvement, and the promotion of liberal and social democracy. This 
framework enables the understanding of discussions about democratic develop-
ments, and the claims that democracy in general is in crisis. Whether the claims are 
correct depends on the bracketing of democracy.
Whereas scholarly research is rather broad in its bracketing of democracy, interna-
tional rankings are comparable in their emphasis on developments in liberal democracy 
(our bracket six). Our analysis of such rankings shows that the classical way in which 
democracy was bracketed, namely, in terms of contestation and inclusiveness, gave 
way to a new bracketing in which the decisions made by governments in terms of lib-
eral democracy are central. This was illustrated for the Polish case. International rank-
ing institutes make it appear that democracy in Poland is in crisis, but this is substantiated 
mainly by their assessment of the decisions of Polish elected officials regarding the 
conditions for liberal democracy. empirical evidence about citizens perceived as stake-
holders and their public participation in political decision making and local develop-
ment could provide quite another picture of developments in Polish democracy.
We acknowledge immediately that the analysis presented here could have been 
much more detailed, and that the international rankings differ in much more aspects 
than mentioned here. One can, for instance, point to the varying ways in which they 
compile an overall score for democracy based on the indicators used. Such analyses 
are also needed but would go beyond the scope of this article.
Furthermore, such points only strengthen the conclusion drawn here, namely, that 
sense-making of democratic developments can vary enormously in theory, and that 
the broadness of the bracketing of democratic developments in international rank-
ings varies also. Often, this bracketing is rather limited, only sometimes somewhat 
broader. The rankings have in common that they focus especially on developments 
in liberal democracy and tend to underrate the classic aspects of democracy, that is, 
contestation and inclusiveness. In that sense, they are not always convincing in their 
claim on democratic backsliding.
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